

# Baker&O'Brien

- Energy Advisory and Consulting Firm based in Houston, Dallas, and London
- Technical and Commercial Due Diligence

#### Natural Gas, LNG, and Midstream Group



Kent Bayazitoglu Consultant (me)



Ajey Chandra CEO - GPA Board Member




Jeremy Goh Consultant – Presenter





#### What was Winter Storm Uri?

- Severe Winter Storm impacting Texas and the Mid Continental States in February 2021
- Caused record high prices, power outages, death, and economic destruction







#### It's Been Four Years... Why Talk Now?

- Time to digest and receive facts
  - Why energy systems failed
  - Competing narratives
- Relevant to other unexpected disasters
  - Hurricane Beryl (Houston Summer 2024)
  - California Fires (January 2025)
  - Spanish Blackouts (April 2025)
  - Texas Floods (July 2025)
- Could it happen again?
  - What has been done and what challenges are ahead





# The Aftermath and the Blame Game

#### **Timeline of Events**

- Mid February 2021: Arctic air mass descends into Texas and the midcontinental area (Oklahoma/Kansas)
- Widespread power outages
- "Eye-popping" record high power and natural gas prices
- High prices turn disagreements into major disputes
- 200-plus deaths, \$80 \$130 billion in damages<sup>1</sup>
- Big (not so Beautiful) Bills for utilities
  - Spreads cost to customers over many years
  - Texas utilities sold \$3.5 billion of 15-year bonds<sup>1</sup>
- 1. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
- 2. Texas Natural Gas Securitization Finance Corporation bonds with final maturities in 2035 and 2039





#### **Blame Game – Article and Studies**

- Renewables blame fossil fuels
- Producers blame renewables
- Power plants blame natural gas producers
- Gas producers/processors blame the power plants





Texas' Blackouts Blew In on the Wind

The grid nearly failed because of an energy mix weighted toward unreliable sources of power.

From WSJ







# What Went Wrong

#### **Extreme Weather Event**

Triple Threat of an unpresented winter event


- Extreme cold, Sustained, and Widespread
- Complacency no recent history of an event that had all three characteristics, temperatures had trended warmer
- Lots of growth in natural gas production and processing which had not been fully tested





#### Extreme, sustained, widespread cold

- Record Lows (Headline number)- easy to quantify
- Sustained Cold allowed deep penetration to underground pipes, wells, equipment, buildings – harder to quantify
- Widespread cold spiked power demand and decreased generation in neighboring states, challenging power imports – difficult to quantify to compare to prior years







#### Lack of Winterization/Backup Power

- Not Enough Winterization
  - Insulation of plants, buildings, equipment, cooling water lines, lack of heaters
  - Recommendations made 2011 freeze (Frozen Dallas Superbowl)
- Natural Gas Producer Incentives
  - Monthly Index price for February 2021,
     determined in January, was \$2.70/MMBtu
  - Daily prices spiked to between\$300/MMBtu to \$1,200/MMBtu
  - Producers typically receive lower monthly index
  - Risk-reward equation favored not producing








#### **Cutting Power to Critical Infrastructure**

- Gas production and processing plants are critical to the power generation
- Most natural gas production and processing facilities surveyed were not identified as critical load. (FERC report)
- Power providers cut power to gas production and gas processing plants
  - exacerbating the problem



Gas production down 71% Gas processing down 82% (from FERC report)





#### Major Causes of Natural Gas Losses

- Gas Production
  - 50% Well and gathering line freezing
  - 18% Loss of Power

- Gas Processing
  - 61% Lack of upstream gas
  - 18% Loss of Power
  - 13% Freezing at Processing Plant

\*Above Analysis from the FERC Report, alternatively, the surveys from the Enverus report puts more blame on the lack of provided power






## **Power Plant Generation by Type (ERCOT)**

- Power generation failed to meet power demand
- Natural gas produced the majority of power
- All major power generation types declined due to the storm

\*ERCOT data








#### **Generation vs capacity/expectations – Feb. 15-17**

- Only gas powered generation increased during the storm and provided the majority of power
- Nominally, gas performed the most below expectations
- All fuel types fell
- Performance evaluation depends on measurement criteria








### **Negative Feedback Loops**

- Lack of power reduced gas production and gas processing
- Reduced gas production and gas processing reduced power generation
- Power plants and equipment not running were more likely to get cold and freeze up








### **ERCOT Independence Had Little Impact**

- ERCOT did import power
- Power imports limited by capacity restrictions on power lines
- Neighboring zones were short of power and had load shedding







# Can this Happen Again?

### Why it Won't Happen Again

- Texas passed laws with million-dollar fines to enforce winterization compliance above Winter Storm 2011 recommendations
- More demand response (Paid Load Shedding Volunteers)
- More wind and solar (most helpful in summer)
- Battery capacity added






## **Lots of Battery Capacity Added**

- Helps balance renewable power
- 10 GW is 15% of peak load
- Short Term Only
  -11 GWhr provides 15%
  of peak load for one hour

Total commercially operational capacity is now nearly 11 GWh

Commercially operational BESS capacity in ERCOT, by energy capacity (GWh)







### Why It Can Happen Again

- Huge growth in power demand from data centers/LNG plants
- Not adding enough dispatchable fuel sources (gas/coal/oil)
- Added capacity is renewable non-dispatchable and seasonal
- Batteries only add short-term relief, primarily for grid stability

What will the event look like?

• Likely an unforeseen, different event that the market is not prepared for





#### **Final Thoughts**

- Be critical of headlines/articles regarding Uri and the reliability of power sources
- Gas processing is critical to our power infrastructure
  - Follow winterization recommendations
  - Communicate with power providers/transmitters
- Rapid growth in power demand will challenge the system
- Can't anticipate all events, additional spare capacity is needed but that comes at a high cost





# Thank you!